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MAC_STUB(4)

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NAME    [Toc]    [Back]

     mac_stub -- MAC policy stub module

SYNOPSIS    [Toc]    [Back]

     To compile the sample policy into your kernel, place the following lines
     in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC
	   options MAC_STUB

     Alternately, to load the sample module at boot time, place the following
     line in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

	   mac_stub_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION    [Toc]    [Back]

     The mac_stub policy module implements a sample MAC policy that has no
     effect on access control in the system.  Unlinke 4(mac_none), each MAC
     entry point is defined as a ``no-op'', so the policy module will be
     entered for each event, but no change in system behavior should result.

   Label Format    [Toc]    [Back]
     No labels are defined for mac_stub.

SEE ALSO    [Toc]    [Back]

      
      
     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4),
     mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4),
     mac_seeotheruids(4), mac_test(4), mac(9)

HISTORY    [Toc]    [Back]

     The mac_stub policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.1 and was developed
 by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS    [Toc]    [Back]

     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates
 Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc.
     under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as part of the
     DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS    [Toc]    [Back]

     See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use.	The TrustedBSD
     MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD.

     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
     the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
     point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on,
     in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.


FreeBSD 5.2.1		       December 1, 2002 		 FreeBSD 5.2.1
[ Back ]
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