NAME    [Toc]    [Back]

     mac_partition -- process partition policy

SYNOPSIS    [Toc]    [Back]

     To compile the process partition policy into your kernel, place the following
 lines in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC
	   options MAC_PARTITION

     Alternately, to load the process partition module at boot time, place the
     following line in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

	   mac_partition_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION    [Toc]    [Back]

     The mac_partition policy module implements a process partition policy,
     which allows administrators to place running processes into
     ``partitions'', based on their numeric process partition (specified in
     the process's MAC label).	Processes with a specified partition can only
     see processes that are in the same partition.  If no partition is specified
 for a process, it can see all other processes in the system (subject
     to other MAC policy restrictions not defined in this man page).  No provisions
 for placing processes into multiple partitions are available.

   Label Format    [Toc]    [Back]
     Partition labels take on the following format:

	   partition/value

     Where value can be any integer value or ``none''.	For example:

	   partition/1
	   partition/20
	   partition/none

SEE ALSO    [Toc]    [Back]

     lomac(4), mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4),
     mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_portacl(4),
     mac_seeotheruids(4), mac_test(4), maclabel(7), mac(9)

HISTORY    [Toc]    [Back]

     The mac_partition policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was
     developed by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS    [Toc]    [Back]

     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates
 Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc.
     under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as part of the
     DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS    [Toc]    [Back]

     See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use.	The TrustedBSD
     MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD.

     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
     the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
     point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on,
     in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.


FreeBSD 5.2.1		       December 9, 2002 		 FreeBSD 5.2.1