securelevel - securelevel and its effects
The OpenBSD kernel provides four levels of system security:
-1 Permanently insecure mode
- init(8) will not attempt to raise the securelevel
- may only be set with sysctl(8) while the system is
insecure
- otherwise identical to securelevel 0
0 Insecure mode
- used during bootstrapping and while the system is
single-user
- all devices may be read or written subject to
their permissions
- system file flags may be cleared
1 Secure mode
- default mode when system is multi-user
- securelevel may no longer be lowered except by
init
- /dev/mem and /dev/kmem may not be written to
- raw disk devices of mounted file systems are readonly
- system immutable and append-only file flags may
not be removed
- kernel modules may not be loaded or unloaded
- the fs.posix.setuid sysctl(8) variable may not be
raised
- the net.inet.ip.sourceroute sysctl(8) variable may
not be
raised
2 Highly secure mode
- all effects of securelevel 1
- raw disk devices are always read-only whether
mounted or not
- settimeofday(2) and clock_settime(2) may not set
the time backwards
or close to overflow
- pfctl(8) may no longer alter filter or nat rules
- the ddb.console and ddb.panic sysctl(8) variables
may not be
raised
Securelevel provides convenient means of ``locking down'' a
system to a
degree suited to its environment. It is normally set at
boot via the
rc.securelevel(8) script, or the superuser may raise securelevel at any
time by modifying the kern.securelevel sysctl(8) variable.
However, only
init(8) may lower it once the system has entered secure
mode. A kernel
built with option INSECURE in the config file will default
to permanently
insecure mode.
Highly secure mode may seem Draconian, but is intended as a
last line of
defence should the superuser account be compromised. Its
effects preclude
circumvention of file flags by direct modification of
a raw disk
device, or erasure of a file system by means of newfs(8).
Further, it
can limit the potential damage of a compromised ``firewall''
by prohibiting
the modification of packet filter rules. Preventing the
system clock
from being set backwards aids in post-mortem analysis and
helps ensure
the integrity of logs. Precision timekeeping is not affected because the
clock may still be slowed.
Because securelevel can be modified with the in-kernel debugger ddb(4), a
convenient means of locking it off (if present) is provided
on highly secure
systems. This is accomplished by setting ddb.console
and ddb.panic
to 0 with the sysctl(8) utility.
/etc/rc.securelevel commands that run before the security
level changes
chflags(2), settimeofday(2), mem(4), options(4), init(8),
rc(8),
sysctl(8)
The securelevel manual page first appeared in OpenBSD 2.6.
The list of securelevel's effects may not be comprehensive.
OpenBSD 3.6 January 4, 2000
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