systrace - generate and enforce system call policies
systrace [-AaCeitUu] [-c uid:gid] [-d policydir] [-f file]
[-g gui]
[-p pid] command ...
The systrace utility monitors and controls an application's
access to the
system by enforcing access policies for system calls. The
systrace utility
might be used to trace an untrusted application's access
to the system.
Alternatively, it might be used to protect the system
from software
bugs (such as buffer overflows) by constraining a daemon's
access to the
system. Its privilege elevation feature can be used to obviate the need
to run large, untrusted programs as root when only one or
two system
calls require root privilege.
The access policy can be generated interactively or obtained
from a policy
file. Interactive policy generation will be performed by
the
``notification user agent'', normally xsystrace(1), unless
text mode is
specified via -t.
When running in ``automatic enforcement'' mode, operations
not covered by
the policy raise an alarm and allow a user to refine the
currently configured
policy.
The options are as follows:
-A Automatically generate a policy that allows every
operation the
application executes. The created policy functions
as a base
that can be refined.
-a Enables automatic enforcement of configured policies. An operation
not covered by policy is denied and logged via
syslog(3),
or to stderr if the -e flag is specified.
-C Run systrace in cradle mode; currently, when multiple processes
are started with systrace protection, each systrace
starts its
own UI (user interface) process. Cradle mode allows a user to
attach all systrace processes to one UI. This may
be useful,
for example, in scenarios where systrace is being
heavily used.
If a cradle server is not running, one is launched.
-c uid:gid
Specifies the uid and gid that the monitored application should
be executed with, which must be specified as nonnegative integers
(not as names). This is useful in conjunction
with privilege
elevation and requires root privilege.
-d policydir
Specifies an alternative location for the user's
directory from
which policies are loaded and to which changed
policies are
stored.
-e Specifies to log to stderr instead of syslog(3).
-f file The policies specified in file are added to the
policies that
systrace knows about.
-g gui Specifies an alternative location for the notification user interface.
-i Inherits the policy - child processes inherit policy of the parent
binary.
-p pid Specifies the pid of a process that systrace should
attach to.
The full path name of the corresponding binary has
to be specified
as command.
-t Uses text mode to ask for interactive policy generation.
-U Ignore user-configured policies and use only global
system policies.
-u Do not perform aliasing on system call names.
Aliasing is enabled
by default to group similar system calls into
a single
compound name. For example, system calls that read
from the
file system like lstat() and access() are translated to
fsread().
POLICY [Toc] [Back]
The policy is specified via the following grammar:
filter = expression "then" action errorcode logcode
expression = symbol | "not" expression | "(" expression
")" |
expression "and" expression | expression "or" expression
symbol = string typeoff "match" cmdstring |
string typeoff "eq" cmdstring | string typeoff "neq"
cmdstring |
string typeoff "sub" cmdstring | string typeoff
"nsub" cmdstring |
string typeoff "inpath" cmdstring | string typeoff
"re" cmdstring |
"true"
typeoff = /* empty */ | "[" number "]"
action = "permit" | "deny" | "ask"
errorcode = /* empty */ | "[" string "]"
logcode = /* empty */ | "log"
The cmdstring is an arbitrary string enclosed with quotation
marks. The
errorcode is used to return an errno(2) value to the system
call when using
a deny action. The values ``inherit'' and ``detach''
have special
meanings when used with a permit rule for the execve system
call. When
using ``inherit,'' the current policy is inherited for the
new binary.
With ``detach,'' systrace detaches from a process after successfully completing
the execve system call.
The ask action specifies that the user should be prompted
for a decision
every time that the rule matches.
The filter operations have the following meaning:
match Evaluates to true if file name globbing according to
fnmatch(3) succeeds.
eq Evaluates to true if the system call argument
matches
cmdstring exactly.
neq This is the logical negation of eq.
sub Performs a substring match on the system call
argument.
nsub This is the logical negation of sub.
inpath Evaluates to true if the system call argument is
a subpath of
cmdstring.
re Evaluates to true if the system call arguments
matches the
specified regular expression.
By appending the log statement to a rule, a matching system
call and its
arguments are logged. This is useful, for example, to log
all invocations
of the execve system call.
Policy entries may contain an appended predicate. Predicates have the
following format:
", if" {"user", "group"} {"=", "!=", "<", ">" } {number,
string}
A rule is added to the configured policy only if its predicate evaluates
to true.
The environment variables $HOME, $USER and $CWD are substituted in rules.
Comments, begun by an unquoted `#' character and continuing
to the end of
the line, are ignored.
With systrace it is possible to remove setuid or setgid binaries, and use
the privilege elevation feature instead. Single system
calls can be executed
with higher privileges if specified by the policy.
For example,
native-bind: sockaddr eq "inet-[0.0.0.0]:22" then permit
as root
allows an unprivileged application to bind to a reserved
port. Privilege
elevation requires that the systrace process is executed as
root.
The following statements can be appended after the permit in
a policy to
elevate the privileges for the matching system call:
as user
as user:group
as :group
The effective uid and gid are elevated only for the duration
of the system
call, and are restored to the old values afterwards (except for the
seteuid or setegid system calls).
/dev/systrace systrace device
/etc/systrace global systrace policies
$HOME/.systrace user specified policies, one per binary,
with slashes in
the full pathname replaced by the underscore character.
An excerpt from a sample ls(1) policy might look as follows:
Policy: /bin/ls, Emulation: native
[...]
native-fsread: filename eq "$HOME" then permit
native-fchdir: permit
[...]
native-fsread: filename eq "/tmp" then permit
native-stat: permit
native-fsread: filename match "$HOME/*" then permit
native-fsread: filename eq "/etc/pwd.db" then permit
[...]
native-fsread: filename eq "/etc" then deny[eperm], if
group != wheel
systrace(4)
The systrace utility was developed by Niels Provos.
Applications that use clone()-like system calls to share the
complete address
space between processes may be able to replace system
call arguments
after they have been evaluated by systrace and escape
policy enforcement.
OpenBSD 3.6 November 28, 2003
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